To view this site you need Adobe Flash Player and your browser must allow javaScripts. Go here to get the latest Flash Player. Effective deterrents Former CIA counterterrorist Faddis noted: “At the risk of sounding simplistic, deterrents have to be things that will make a team of terrorists avoid staging an attack. A terrorist only cares if he actually sees that you are really searching bags with enough frequency to pose a problem for him.” To that end, Faddis said the following security measures are the only “real world … deterrents that will make a difference to a team of hardened, trained pros who are coming to commit mass murder.” Visible armed security at train and subway stations and, at least intermittently, on trains themselves. If nothing else, they should walk the aisles at stops; Frequent bag checks, at least of anything that seems large enough to hold a serious explosive device. These should be done at entrances to stations, randomly on the platform and on cars. They don’t have to target everyone, but should be frequent; Wanding of bags with handheld metal detectors as a supplement to physical inspection of bag contents. This can be done frequently and quickly as long as it is done reasonably professionally. It does not have to be perfect, but it should have a psychological impact on anyone casing the system; As many dogs as possible in stations, at entrances, on platforms, walking down aisles when trains stop in stations and moving aggressively. The dogs do not have to be fully trained because a potential terrorist would have no idea of the dog’s capabilities; he would just know that the dog presents a risk to him and his operation. Putting a few metal detectors and trained personnel in stations, changing their locations at random and screening random passengers, since it’s impractical to screen everyone coming through. “For a team [of terrorists] to pull off a serious rail attack requires multiple players and synchronized actions,” Faddis explained. “I, as team leader of the bad guys, have to be confident that I can put six to 12 guys on different trains all on the same morning and all in the same timeframe—and that nobody gets caught. Because I know that if even one guy gets nabbed, the whole system shuts down and the attack is a failure.” Across the east coast, mass transit authorities said they have put into practice many of the types of security measures Faddis and other counterterrorists say are the most effective deterrents. They rely heavily on a human security presence. A NEW DAY FOR MASS TRANSIT passengers annually and is growing in ridership at a rate four times that of any other passenger rail system. “We encountered no railway security personnel of any kind,” Faddis explained. “The only officials noted were conductors on the train. There was never any ID check of any kind done before passengers boarded the train. No bag searches were ever done. No explosive sniffing dogs were ever sighted. No metal detectors were ever seen. “In short,” Faddis said, “what eight months of daily observation of VRE showed was that, despite the fact that it services the nation’s capital and is the second busiest passenger rail system in the United States, there are no security measures of any kind in place to prevent a repetition of a Madrid-style attack.” Faddis said he encountered similar lack of security on MARC, Maryland’s equivalent of VRE. MARC transports more than 30,000 passengers a day, services 43 stations and terminates at Union Station near the Capitol and Senate office buildings. “Security measures on MARC were determined to be a mirror image of those on VRE,” Faddis said, adding, “there were no sightings whatsoever of security personnel, dogs, metal detectors or any other impediment to terrorist 24 April 2009 | www.HSToday.us This month’s issue is now available online at…